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A TALE OF REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
AND JAPAN: DOES CHARACTERIZING THE BUSINESS 
OF STORED-VALUE CARDS AS A FINANCIAL ACTIVITY 
IMPACT ITS DEVELOPMENT? 
Jean J. Luyat† 
Abstract: The use of stored-value cards is growing rapidly in urban areas in Japan 
and gaining acceptance as a major means of payment.  While institutional and cultural 
factors as well as business strategies go far in explaining the rapid growth of stored-value 
cards in Japan, regulation has also played an important role in enabling their use.  In 
Japan, the regulation of stored-value cards has been mostly left to the Prepaid Card Law, 
which provides a comparatively simple regulatory framework with flexible capital 
requirements. 
The European Union (“EU”) and France provide a compelling counter-example to 
Japan; the EU has pursued a different regulatory course and demand for stored-value 
cards has remained low there.  Pressed by monetary concerns, the EU has directed its 
member countries to regulate electronic money according to its E-Money Directive.  
Following this Directive, France implemented a complex three-tiered regulatory 
framework with high capital requirements.  European regulators are now questioning the 
Directive, which appears to have stifled the growth of stored-value cards.  With Japan 
steaming ahead with stored-value cards, regulators worldwide may want to look to Japan 
for guidance. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When Kozo Matsuoka, an information technology worker based in 
Fukuoka, makes his bi-monthly trips to Tokyo to visit clients, his cell phone 
is the most valuable item he brings on the trip.  His cell phone contains a 
contactless integrated circuit (“IC”) chip1 that incorporates the data of three 
different electronic money issuers from whom Kozo regularly purchases 
prepaid electronic funds: Suica,2 Pasmo3 and Edy.4  He can recharge these 
                                           
†
  Juris Doctor expected 2010, University of Washington School of Law.  The author would like to 
thank Professors Veronica Taylor and Nobuhiko Sugiura as well as all the members of the Pacific Rim Law 
& Policy Journal for their advice and help in writing this Comment.  Any errors or omissions in this 
analysis are the author’s own.   
1
  A contactless Integrated Circuit (IC) chip is a miniature electronic circuit that can store electronic 
data and on which an IC chip reader/writer can withdraw and insert information without requiring contact.  
AKIO IWATA, DENSHI MANĒ SAIGŌ SENSŌ [ELECTRONIC MONEY: THE FINAL BATTLE] 13, 112 (2007).  In 
Japan, stored-value cards are commonly referred to under the broader name of “Electronic Money.”  See id.  
2
  Suica is a rechargeable contactless smart-card based stored-value ticketing and payment system 
issued by JR East.  See JR East website, Suica, http://www.jreast.co.jp/e/suica/ (last visited May 8, 2009).   
3
  Pasmo is a rechargeable contactless smart-card-based stored-value ticketing and payment system 
issued by a consortium private railway companies in Japan.  Pasmo website, Participating Railways and 
Bus Companies, http://www.pasmo.co.jp/en/index.html (last visited May 8, 2009). 
4
  Edy is a rechargeable contactless smart-card-based stored-value payment system issued by 
bitWallet, Inc.  See Edy Website, http://www.edy.jp/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2009).   
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funds at recharging booths, usually located near train stations or convenience 
stores.  These recharging booths record the purchased funds either on the IC 
chip itself or on a distant centralized online server.  Generally, Kozo 
purchases about ¥40,000 to ¥60,0005 in prepaid funds every month from the 
three issuers, but seldom spends more than ¥2,000 on any one purchase.6  He 
uses these electronic funds to ride trains, make purchases at vending 
machines, convenience stores, and a variety of other locations.  This IC chip 
can also store digitized airline tickets and act as boarding pass that enables 
Kozo to bypass check-in.  He can also change his reservation or seat 
assignment at any time before departure using his cell phone’s internet 
access.   
Kozo uses Suica and Pasmo to ride on almost any train or bus in the 
Tokyo metropolitan area.  His cellphone’s IC chip opens the automated entry 
turnstiles, which automatically subtract the minimum required amount for a 
journey on the train.  The exit turnstiles then calculate and subtract the 
remaining fare based on the length of his journey.  Completing a transaction 
to purchase a sandwich from a convenience store or pay for a taxi takes less 
than a second by hovering the cellphone a few inches over an IC chip reader.  
For Kozo, there are other benefits besides convenience; Edy also allows him 
to make purchases while earning mileage points with his preferred air 
carrier.7   
Kozo’s experience illustrates the development of contactless stored-
value cards in Japan as a major means of payment.  Stored-value cards have 
grown from a closed payment system originally limited to railway 
companies into an increasingly accepted open payment system8 used as a 
                                           
5
  Approximately US $400 to $600.  As of May 8, 2009, the US Dollar to Japanese Yen exchange 
rate was approximately 98 Yen to the Dollar.  See Yahoo Finance, Currency Investing. 
http://finance.yahoo.com/currency-investing (last visited May 8, 2009).   
6
  Approximately US $20.  Kozo’s spending behavior is consistent with that of the average stored-
value card user in Japan; in 2008, the average purchase was ¥696 (approximately US $7).  BANK OF JAPAN, 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ELECTRONIC MONEY IN JAPAN, Oct. 2008, http://www.boj.or.jp/en/type/ 
ronbun/ron/research07/data/ron0810a.pdf (last visited May 8, 2009). 
7
  The author would like to thank Kozo Matsuoka for sharing his experience using electronic money 
in Japan. 
8
  Prepaid, or “stored-value,” cards are broken into three distinct categories:  “closed” systems in 
which the user can purchase goods and services as provided typically by one merchant or one issuer; 
“open” systems where the user may purchase goods and services at a wide range or merchants; and “semi-
closed” systems which fall in between the two categories.  Although Japan’s electronic money is not 
universally accepted, its widespread acceptance in urban areas means that it probably constitutes an “open 
system.”  See MARK BUDNITZ & MARGOT SAUNDERS, CONSUMER BANKING AND PAYMENTS LAW 169 
(2002); Anita Ramasastry, Nonbank Issuers of Electronic Money: Prudential Regulation in Comparative 
Perspective, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW 663, 668-69 (International 
Monetary Fund ed., 2005).   
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cash substitute.9  The evolution has been technological as well.  Originally, 
issuers incorporated IC chips in cards about the same size as credit cards.  
Now, IC chips are also included in cell phones,10 which transfer data back 
and forth with distant online servers where the funds are stored.11 
The rapid development and growing adoption of stored-value cards as 
a major means of payment in Japan cannot be attributed to a single factor.  
Nevertheless, “institutions matter,” according to Professor Ronald Mann, 
who has identified four institutional structures that affect the development of 
payment systems:  the retail environment, the size of the national economy, 
the cost of telecommunications, and the nature of the regulatory 
environment.12  To better grasp the regulatory environment’s impact on the 
development of stored-value cards in Japan, this Comment compares it with 
the regulation in another region that has not witnessed the same explosive 
growth—the European Union (“EU”). 
Despite implementing the E-Money Directive to foster the 
development of electronic money, which includes stored-value cards, in 
2000, demand in the EU has not met expectations.13  Within the EU, France 
provides a particularly compelling case-study of the impacts of the E-Money 
Directive.  With Europe’s second largest population and third largest 
economy,14 and with a per capita GDP on par with Japan,15 France exhibits 
similar macroeconomic conditions.  Demand for stored-value cards remains 
relatively low there and, in the absence of competitors, Moneo16 remains 
                                           
9
  See IWATA, supra note 1, at 13, 112.   
10
  For convenience, this Comment will refer to these Japanese prepaid payment systems as stored-
value cards even though they are conceptually no longer only cards.   
11
 Nobuhiko Sugiura, Denshi Manē to Hō: Denshi Manē wo Meguru Hōteki Genjō to Kongō no Kadai 
ni Tsuite [Electronic Money and the Law: Legal Realities and Future Challenges], 1361 JURISUTO 74, 79 
(2008).  A translation of this article precedes this Comment. 
12
  Ronald J. Mann, Credit Cards and Debit Cards in the United States and Japan, 55 VAND. L. REV. 
1055, 1108, 1059-60 (2002).   
13
  See Council Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Electronic 
Money: Taking up, Pursuit and Prudential Supervision of the Business of Electronic Money Institutions 
(amend. Directives 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC; repeal. Directive 2000/46/EC), COM/2008/0627 final 
(Oct. 9, 2008), rec. 2 [hereinafter 2008 Council Proposal].   
14
  See The CIA World Factbook, Country Comparisons—GDP, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html (last visited May 8, 2009); The CIA World 
Factbook, Country Comparisons—Population, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html (last visited May 8, 2009). 
15
  See The CIA World Factbook, Country Comparisons—GDP per capita, https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html (last visited May 8, 2009) (Japan:  
$34,200; France:  $32,700).   
16
  Moneo is a stored-value card issued by SFPMEI (Société Financière du Porte-Monnaie 
Electronique [Financial Company of the Electronic Purse]), which is held by consortium of major French 
banks and supported by the French Ministry of Finance and Industry.  See Moneo, Le Porte Monnaie 
Electronique Français, [Moneo, the French e-purse], at 2, 13, http://www.moneo.net/fileadmin/ 
user_upload/PDF/plaquette_institutionnelle_2008-p15.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).  
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France’s only major stored-value card issuer.17  In addition, France’s central 
bank has long favored strong regulation of stored-value cards, subjecting 
them to bank-like regulations.18 
This Comment argues that differing characterizations of stored-value 
cards produced different regulatory systems in Japan and France.  Although 
many factors account for growth in Japan and stagnation in France, 
European regulation as applied in France appears to be burdening the 
development of stored-value cards to a greater degree than Japanese 
regulation.  Part II compares the development of stored-value cards in Japan 
and Europe, focusing on France.  Part III briefly explores reasons for the 
rapid growth of stored-value cards in Japan, and how Japanese law regulates 
these products.  Part IV examines why stored-value cards are not emerging 
as a major means of payment in France and contrasts the current European 
regulatory framework with that of Japan, focusing on the E-Money Directive 
and its application in French law. 
II. STORED-VALUE CARDS ARE GROWING RAPIDLY IN JAPAN BUT NOT 
GAINING ACCEPTANCE AS A PAYMENT METHOD IN THE EU AND FRANCE 
Because this Comment seeks to determine the impact of the regulatory 
environment on the development of stored-value cards, this section 
examines the growth of stored-value cards as a means of payment in Japan, 
Europe, and France.   
The use of stored-value cards is growing rapidly in Japanese urban 
areas as a means of payment, and this rate of this growth has accelerated.  
From 2005 to 2007, the number of issued stored-value cards increased from 
30 million to 80 million. 19   In 2007, the volume of stored-value card 
transactions was seventy times larger than debit card transactions and one 
third of credit card transactions,20 while the outstanding value of electronic 
money in Japan reached ¥77 billion21 at the end of March 2008.22  The value 
                                           
17
  EVALUATION OF THE E-MONEY DIRECTIVE (2000/46/EC)—FINAL REPORT, app. at 22 (Feb. 17, 
2006), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/e-money/evaluation_en.pdf (last visited May. 8, 
2009) [hereinafter EVALUATION OF THE E-MONEY DIRECTIVE]. 
18
  See Dévelopments Récents en Matière de Monnaie Electronique [Recent Electronic Money 
Developments], Bulletin de la Banque de France No. 72, Dec. 1999, at 90, available at http://www.banque-
france.fr/fr/publications/telechar/bulletin/etud72_3.pdf.   
19
  Nobuhiko Sugiura, supra note 11, at 74.   
20
  BANK OF JAPAN, supra note 6. 
21
  As of May 8, 2009, the exchange rate between the Japanese Yen and the Euro was approximately 
133 Yen to the Euro.  European Central Bank, Foreign Exchange Rates, http://www.ecb.int/stats/ 
exchange/eurofxref/html/index.en.html#dowloads (last visited May 8, 2009).  The Exchange rate between 
the Euro and the United States Dollar was 1.34 Dollars to the Euro.  Id.  However, the reader may find it 
simpler to compare Yen and Euro figures at 100 Yen to the Euro. 
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of stored-value card transactions is expected to exceed ¥3 trillion in 2012, up 
from ¥175 billion in 2006. 23   A recent survey of four major Japanese 
metropolitan areas revealed that one in two residents used a stored-value 
card,24 and terminals accepting stored-value cards now largely outnumber 
ATMs.25  New issuers, each attempting to tap new uses for stored-value 
cards, have emerged almost every year since Suica started issuing cards in 
2001.26  As Professor Nobuhiko Sugiura argues in Electronic Money and the 
Law: Legal Realities and Future Challenges, 27  stored-value cards have 
become a substantial force to be reckoned with, one that has the potential to 
one day replace cash as the primary form of payment in Japan.28   
By its own account, the EU is not satisfied with the demand for 
stored-value cards. 29   Figures directly comparable with Japan are not 
available, but statistics reflect that stored-value cards are not emerging as a 
major means of payment.  Stored-value cards represented only 0.7% of the 
volume of non-cash transactions in 2007.30   The European Commission 
estimated the total amount of electronic money31 in circulation in Europe 
increased from 675 million euro in 2005 to 1,053 million euro in 2007, a 
figure that includes server-based electronic money, 32  which has been 
growing at a faster pace.33  When considering the EU’s larger population,34 
these numbers reflect lower growth and usage rates. 
                                                                                                                              
22
  BANK OF JAPAN, supra note 6. 
23
  Nobuhiko Sugiura, supra note 11, at 74. 
24
  Etona Ueda, Presentation made before the FTC’s Conference at the University of Washington:  
Pay on the Go, Consumers and Contactless Payments: e-Money and the Evolution of Payment Systems in 
Japan, at 3 (July 24, 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/payonthego/presentations/ueda.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2009). 
25
  BANK OF JAPAN, supra note 6. 
26
  See id.; Etona Ueda, supra note 24, at 4. 
27
  Nobuhiko Sugiura, supra note 11, at 75. 
28
  Id., supra note 11, at 75. 
29
  COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, IMPACT ASSESSMENT, EUR. PARL. DOC. NO. 
COM(2008)627, at 6, available at http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/ia_carried_out/docs/ia_2008/ 
sec_2008_2573_en.pdf (accompanying the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Amending Directive 2000/46/EC on the taking up, pursuit of and prudential supervision of the 
business of electronic money institutions) [hereinafter IMPACT ASSESSMENT]. 
30
  IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 29, at 8. 
31
  In Europe, electronic money includes both card-based e-money (stored-value cards) and server-
based e-money (pre-funded payment schemes such as Paypal).  See EVALUATION OF THE E-MONEY 
DIRECTIVE, supra note 17, at 21, 29.  In Japan, electronic money generally refers to stored-value cards only 
(although post-pay systems are sometimes included in the definition).  See, e.g., IWATA, supra note 1, at 73 
(describing stored-value cards as electronic money); Nobuhiko Sugiura, supra note 11, at 75 (same; 
distinguishing “post-pay” electronic money).   
32
  Server-based electronic money is a money substitute that is transformed into digital information 
which is then stored on a central server, which consumers can access and use by logging on to a website.  
See Ramasastry, supra note 8, at 665-667.   
33
  IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 30, at 8.  
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In France, stored-value card issuers are largely absent from the 
payments market.  Although limited-purpose electronic gift cards 35  are 
growing, and cell-phone operators are developing prepaid services,36 Moneo 
remained France’s lone major stored-value card issuer as of 2007.37  Moneo 
has not yet been met with widespread acceptance.38  Société Financière du 
Porte-Monnaie Electronique (“SFPMEI”), a credit institution backed by 
major French banks, instituted Moneo in 1999, but did not roll it out across 
the French territory until 2004, around the same time that Japan’s JR East 
launched Suica.39  At the end of 2007, only one million consumers used 
Moneo.40  Stored-value cards, then, are not yet emerging as a major means of 
payment in France. 
III. WHAT ACCOUNTS FOR THE GROWTH OF STORED-VALUE CARDS IN 
JAPAN? 
Regulation alone cannot account for the rapid growth of stored-value 
cards in Japan.  Rather, businesses emerge in a complex environment where 
business strategy, infrastructure, and policy interact. 41   Japan’s payment 
culture and unique socio-economic factors are crucial in explaining the 
growth of stored-value cards.  Japan’s Prepaid Card Law has also provided a 
supportive regulatory environment with a simple and flexible framework for 
issuers.  But, today, technological developments and widespread use of 
stored-value cards are straining the regulatory capacity of the Prepaid Card 
Law. 
                                                                                                                              
34
  The CIA estimates the population of the European Union at 491,582,852.  The CIA World 
Factbook, European Union, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.html (last 
visited May 9, 2009).  In contrast, Japan’s population stands at 127,078,679.  The CIA World Factbook, 
Japan, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html (last visited May 9, 2009).  
35
  Gift-cards are generally single-purpose cards where one issuer supplies the card for one type of 
purchase.  See BUDNITZ & SAUNDERS, supra note 8, at 169. 
36
  EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, BLUE BOOK: PAYMENT AND SECURITIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 233-34 (2007), available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/ecbbluebook 
ea200708en.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2009).   
37
  Visa and Mastercard also issue stored value-cards, but only 70,000 such cards circulated in France 
in 2007.  See OBSERVATOIRE DE LA SECURITE DES CARTES DE PAIEMENT, RAPPORT ANNUEL 14 (2007), 
http://www.banque-france.fr/observatoire/telechar/rap_an_2007.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2009). 
38
  EVALUATION OF THE E-MONEY DIRECTIVE, supra note 17, at 26.  
39
  See Moneo, Le Porte Monnaie Electronique Français, supra note 16, at 2-4, 13.   
40
  OBSERVATOIRE DE LA SECURITE DES CARTES DE PAIEMENT, supra note 37, at 14.  
41
  See generally CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO 
THE NETWORK ECONOMY 3-18 (1999) (explaining the economic principles behind successful information 
technology businesses). 
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A. Payment Culture, Technology, and Original Business Models Partly 
Explain the Growth of Stored-Value Cards in Japan 
Many non-legal factors explain the growth of stored-value cards in 
Japan.  Nonetheless, three factors stand out:  Japan’s unique payment 
culture, technology that confers additional benefits compared to cash, and 
business strategies. 
1. Japan’s Predilection for Cash and the Late Arrival of Debit Cards 
May Account for the Widespread Adoption of Stored-Value Cards  
One important characteristic of Japanese payment practices is the 
predilection of Japanese consumers to pay with cash.42  The reasons for this 
may be due in part to cultural traditions: gift-giving marks both life and 
seasonal cycles in Japan, and many gifts are made with large cash amounts.43  
In addition, a relatively crime-free society makes it safe for the Japanese to 
carry large amounts of cash.44  Japanese consumers also do not use checks, 
which accounts for their reliance on cash as a primary means of payment.45  
This reliance on cash may contribute to the growth of stored-value cards, 
which are conceptually closer to cash than credit cards.  Using a credit card 
creates a liability that must be repaid in the future, as consumers temporarily 
borrow money that they do not have. 46   But for Japanese consumers, 
carrying a stored-value card containing ¥5,00047  is almost equivalent to 
carrying ¥5,000 in cash.  Once consumers exhaust the prepaid funds they 
must recharge the card, just as one withdraws additional cash from the ATM. 
Directly related to this predilection for cash is the relatively low usage 
rates of debit cards in Japan, which partially explains the success of stored-
value cards.48  Japanese consumers’ willingness to carry cash and the late 
development of debit cards accounts for the country’s low debit card usage 
rates.49  If debit cards function as a substitute for cash,50 then stored-value 
                                           
42
  Japanese Bankers Association, Payment Systems in Japan, http://www.zenginkyo.or.jp/en/banks/ 
payment_systems/index.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2009).  
43
  See KATHERINE RUPP, GIFT-GIVING IN JAPAN 73-97 (2003).  
44
 See Mann, supra note 12 at 1059.  
45
  RONALD J. MANN, CARD-BASED PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 2 n.5 (Bank of 
Japan, ed., 1999). 
46
  Nobuhiko Sugiura, supra note 11, at 76-77.  
47
  Approximately US $50. 
48
  Mann, supra note 12, at 1100-01. 
49
  Id. at 1102. 
50
  See id. at 1102 (describing how consumers use debit cards to avoid using cash in the United 
States).  
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cards may be filling a void left by the relative absence of debit cards in 
Japan’s payment structure. 
2. Stored-Value Cards Offer Japanese Consumers Additional Benefits 
Compared to Cash 
Japanese stored-value cards offer customers increased speed and 
usability compared to cash because they do not require a time-consuming 
cash exchange.51  Thanks to contactless IC chips, transactions can now be 
completed in just 0.2 seconds.52   Contactless payment also provides the 
added benefit of not having to remove a card from a wallet to effectuate 
payment because sensors will detect the IC chip once it is just two or three 
inches from the IC chip reader.53  Furthermore, incorporating IC chips in cell 
phones increases convenience because several stored-value card systems can 
now be bundled into a single cell phone.54  More importantly, bundling 
stored-value cards with cell phones is particularly convenient for Japanese 
consumers because cell phones are widespread in Japan.55  Increased speed 
and usability compared to regular cash help explain the development of 
stored-value cards in Japan. 
Loyalty programs also play an important role in generating support for 
stored-value cards.56  Edy, Japan’s largest stored-value card issuer, gained 
consumer loyalty by offering airline mileage. 57   Similarly, Seven and i 
Holdings Co. Ltd.58 made a loyalty program central to its business strategy.59  
                                           
51
  See Nobuhiko Sugiura, supra note 11, at 74.  
52
  See IWATA, supra note 1, at 13-14. 
53
  See Akira Yasuoka & Tomoki Hiratsuka, IC Cards Spur Innovative Change in Financial 
Institutions, NOMURA RES. INST. PAPER, NO. 93 (Aug. 1, 2005), at 6, available at 
http://www.nri.co.jp/english/opinion/papers/2005/pdf/np200593.pdf (last visited May 9, 2009).  
54
  See id. 
55
  At the end of 2007, there were more than 100 million cell phone subscribers in Japan.  See 
MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND COMMUNICATION, WHITE PAPER 43 (2008), available at 
http://www.johotsusintokei.soumu.go.jp/whitepaper/eng/WP2008/chapter2-1.pdf.  
56
  See Hiromichi Yasuoka & Masahiro Kajino, Shōhisha Ishiki no Takamari wo Ikashita “Kigyō 
Tsūka Māketingu” no Dōnyū [The Introduction of “Marketing Corporate Currencies” Capitalizing on 
Increased Consumer Awareness] CHITEKISHISAN SŌZŌ, May 2008, at 86-89, available at 
http://www.nri.co.jp/opinion/chitekishisan/2008/pdf/cs20080507.pdf.  
57
  See id. 
58
  Seven & i Holdings Co., Ltd. is a diversified retail group engaged in the planning, management, 
and operations of convenience, general merchandise, and department stores.  See Seven & i Holdings Co., 
Ltd. Website, Corporate Profile, http://www.7andi.com/en/company/summary.html (last visited Feb. 20, 
2009). 
59
  See Junji Kodama, “nanaco”ni Miru Denshi Manē wo Sasaeru Shisutemu [The System that 
Bolsters Electronic Money as Seen in “nanaco”] CHITEKISHISAN SŌZŌ, Aug. 2007, at 86-89, available at 
http://www.nri.co.jp/opinion/chitekishisan/2007/pdf/cs20070809.pdf.  
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These additional benefits, compared to regular cash, help explain the success 
of stored-value cards in Japan as a major means of payment.60 
3. Japanese Stored-Value Cards Complement Existing Businesses and 
Benefit from Unique Characteristics of the Japanese Market 
Successful stored-value card issuers in Japan are not financial 
institutions but retailers and railway companies. 61   Unlike Visa or 
Mastercard, which generate income by charging retailers a fee for 
processing each transaction,62 Japanese issuers do not generally generate 
income directly through their cards.  Instead, stored-value cards supplement 
issuers’ main businesses by improving efficiency. 63   Stored-value cards 
generally complement an existing business rather than compete directly 
against other payment systems.64  
For example, railway companies such as JR East implemented Suica 
to reduce the costs associated with ticket collectors, and to improve 
efficiency at the turnstile.65  Suica originated as a train fare card for the JR 
East railway in 2001, and it was not until 2004 that it launched its wider 
payment function.66  In urban areas in Japan, commuting by train or subway 
is a way of life;67 by installing a payment function on train fare cards, which 
Japanese commuters use every day, railways simply expanded the use of 
those cards.68  Retailers such as the Aeon group69 and Seven and i holdings 
Co. Ltd. implemented their stored-value cards to collect customer data and to 
strengthen relationships with customers.70   
                                           
60
  See id. at 88.  
61
  See Nobuhiko Sugiura, supra note 11, at 74. 
62
  See generally RONALD MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF PAYMENT 
CARD MARKETS 20-33 (2006) (describing the mechanics of payment transactions). 
63
  IWATA, supra note 1, at 30-31. 
64
  Id. 
65
 Nobuhiko Sugiura, supra note 87, at 74-75; NIHON GINKŌ KESSAIKIKŌKYOKU, KESSAI 
SHISUTEMUTŌ NI KANSURU CHŌSA RONBUN: SAIKIN NO DENSHI MANĒ NO DŌKŌ NI TSUITE [RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN ELECTRONIC MONEY IN JAPAN] (Aug. 2008), at 7, 
http://www.boj.or.jp/type/ronbun/ron/research07/data/ron0808b.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009); see also 
Junji Kodama, supra, note 59, at 89. 
66
  BANK OF JAPAN, supra note 6. 
67
  In 2007, Japanese railways transported 22 billion passengers.  Japanese Ministry of Land 
Transport and Infrastructure, Monthly Statistical Report on Railway Transport (Sept. 2008), 
http://toukei.mlit.go.jp/60/monthly/index.html (last visited Feb. 27. 2009). 
68
  See generally SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 41, at 159-62 (describing the importance of looking 
to complementary products in devising a successful business strategy). 
69
  The Aeon Group is a group of Japanese retailers.  See Aeon Group Homepage, About Aeon, 
http://www.aeon.info/en/aboutaeon/index.html (last visited May 8, 2009). 
70
  See Nobuhiko Sugiura, supra note 11, at 74-75. 
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Japanese issuers also benefit from unique characteristics of the 
Japanese market.  Retailers such as Seven & i holdings are saturation 
retailers with very concentrated presence throughout Japan.71  Consumers 
use them on a daily basis and have many opportunities to make purchases 
with their stored-value cards.  Furthermore, in urban areas, railways are 
often the tenants and developers of areas surrounding train stations, thereby 
giving issuers a lot of leverage in expanding the number of stores that accept 
stored-value cards.72  Japanese issuers not only benefit from an existing large 
network of customers but also from a unique business environment.  
B. The Prepaid Card Law Provides a Simple and Flexible Regulatory 
Framework  
In Japan, many laws regulate stored-value cards, from their 
contractual to their criminal aspects.73  By definition, however, stored-value 
cards fall outside the scope of most banking laws, so the bulk of the 
regulation comes from the Prepaid Card Law.74   
The purpose of the Prepaid Card Law is to regulate the issuance of 
prepaid vouchers, protect the funds of voucher holders, and improve the 
trustworthiness of prepaid vouchers.75  A voucher is a tangible item on which 
value is recorded for the purpose of effectuating payment for goods and 
services with counterparties defined by contract.76  As such, the Prepaid 
Card Law does not target all forms of electronic money, but only electronic 
money that takes the form of a voucher.  Not all vouchers are included.  This 
law covers a broad spectrum of vouchers, including train fare cards and 
admission tickets,77 but does not include government issued vouchers, or 
vouchers used in complex financial transactions.78   
Under Chapter 3 of the Prepaid Card Law, any person or entity may 
issue prepaid vouchers 79  provided they meet certain registration and 
                                           
71
  See Akinobu Terasaka, Development of New Store Types: The Role of Convenience Stores in 
Japan, 45 GEOJOURNAL 317, 318 (1998). 
72
  For example, the Odakyu Group, one of the largest railway operators in Tokyo, operates hotels, 
department stores, advertising agencies, restaurants, and leases retail space along its rail lines and near its 
train stations.  See ODAKYU RAILWAY GROUP, ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2008), available at 
http://www.odakyu.jp/ir/shared/pdf/h20/all.pdf.   
73
  See Nobuhiko Sugiura, supra note 11, at 77-79.  
74
  See id. at 77-79.  
75
  Maebaraishiki Shōhyō no Kiseitō ni Kan Suru Hōritsu [Prepaid Card Law], Law No. 92 of 1989, 
art. 1, as amended. 
76
  Nobuhiko Sugiura, supra note 11, at 78. 
77
  Prepaid Card Law, supra note 75, art. 2. 
78
  Id. art. 3. 
79 
 Id. arts.6-7.  
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prudential requirements.80  To meet registration requirements, issuers must 
submit the name of the issuing entity, its stock capitalization, the name of the 
directors, and indicate the type of voucher to be issued.81  The registration 
may be refused and fines may apply for failing to comply with these 
requirements.82  The Prepaid Card Law does not require issuers to refund 
prepaid funds at the request of the voucher holder, nor does it place 
restrictions on the activities of issuers.83  The Prepaid Card Law applies 
equally regardless of the type of institution that seeks to issue vouchers.   
Article 13 imposes the most significant prudential requirement of the 
Prepaid Card Law, requiring issuers to keep at least half of the value paid by 
a voucher holder as a security deposit.84  This security deposit must in turn 
be invested in government bonds or other secure investments.85  Voucher 
holders also receive priority rights over all other creditors with regards to 
this security deposit, which means that their deposit is at least partially 
protected if the issuer goes bankrupt.86   Because the Prepaid Card Law 
requires issuers to keep fifty percent of the voucher holder’s funds in safe 
investments, the issuer’s capital requirements grow in tandem with the 
growth of its business, regardless of size:  the more cards an entity issues, 
and the more prepaid funds customers purchase, the greater the amount of 
money it must keep in escrow.  Smaller issuers are not burdened vis à vis 
larger issuers:  capital requirements apply equally to all institutions.   
In summary, the Prepaid Card Law provides a simple framework that 
applies equally to bank and non-bank issuers alike and flexible capital 
requirements that are proportional to the size of the issuer.   
C. Technological Development and Growth Are Stretching the Prepaid 
Card Law Thin 
For all its simplicity, the Prepaid Card law also has limitations.  
Growth and technological development are creating new legal challenges 
that the Prepaid Card Law cannot cope with in its present state. 87  
Technological developments and growth are steering stored-value cards in a 
direction where they are becoming less voucher-like.  For example, some 
                                           
80
  Id. arts.7, 13. 
81
  Id. art.7. 
82
  Id. art.9. 
83
  These are importations distinctions compared to European Regulation.  See infra Part IV.B.2-.3. 
84
  Prepaid Card Law art.13. 
85
  Id. art.13, no. 7. 
86
  Id. art.13; see also SHINSAKU IWAHARA, DENSHI MANĒ TO HŌ [ELECTRONIC MONEY AND THE 
LAW] 565-66 (2003).   
87
  Nobuhiko Sugiura, supra note 11, at 79-81.  
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stored-value card issuers have begun storing value not on the card itself, but 
on distant servers.88  The advantage is that when consumers lose the card, 
they do not lose the value on the card because issuers can retrieve the data 
and issue a new card.89  On the other hand, this also means that stored-value 
cards no longer constitute vouchers within the meaning of the Prepaid Card 
Law, which requires the recording of value on a single tangible item.90  As 
issuers store prepaid funds on centralized servers, stored-value cards lose 
their voucher-like quality and begin to resemble deposits: 91   just as 
consumers deposit funds in a bank, stored-value card carriers deposit their 
prepaid funds on a centralized server.  This resemblance to bank deposits 
means that bank regulation may prove more adequate to regulate stored-
value cards and that the Prepaid Card Law is inadequate.92  Neither does the 
Prepaid Card Law address the potential consequences were one of these 
servers to fail, resulting in the loss of account information.93 
Japanese regulators are now deciding whether to strengthen the 
current regulation of stored-value cards, and if so, to what degree.94  At the 
time of writing, a Payment Services Bill is before the Japanese House of 
Representatives.95  If adopted, this law, which covers not only stored-value 
cards but also other forms of funds transfers and interbank fund settlement, 
would retain the broad outlines of the Prepaid Card Law, such as its capital 
and registration requirements.96  It addresses the main flaw of the Prepaid 
Card Law by replacing the concept of “voucher” with the more inclusive 
concept of “prepaid payment instrument,” so as to include server-based 
stored-value cards. 97   Although this proposed law represents a major 
transformation for Japanese payment services regulation and effectively 
revokes the Prepaid Card Law,98 it would not depart significantly from the 
system put in place by the Prepaid Card Law.99  This bill therefore strongly 
                                           
88
  See Junji Kodama, supra note 59, at 89. 
89
  Id. at 88. 
90
  Nobuhiko Sugiura, supra note 11, at 79-80. 
91
  Id. at 80. 
92
  Id. at 80. 
93
  Id. at 79-81. 
94
  See, e.g., Etona Ueda, Presentation made before the FTC’s Conference at the University of 
Washington:  Pay on the Go, Consumers and Contactless Payments: e-Money and the Evolution of 
Payment Systems in Japan, at 150 (July 24, 2008) (transcript), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/ 
payonthego/transcript080724.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2009). 
95
  Shikin Kessai ni Kansuru Hōritsuan [Payment Services Bill], House of Representatives No. 50, 
171st Session (2009).   
96
  Id. art 14.  
97
  Id. art. 3. 
98
  See id. art. 1 (purpose). 
99
  See id. ch. 2. 
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suggests that the Prepaid Card Law has been an effective regulatory 
mechanism because it leaves intact the structure of the Prepaid Card Law.   
IV. WHY ARE STORED-VALUE CARDS NOT EMERGING AS A MAJOR MEANS 
OF PAYMENT IN FRANCE?   
Non-legal reasons such as France’s payment institutions, payment 
culture, and markedly different business strategies may explain the low 
uptake levels of stored-value cards in France.  But regulation seems to factor 
in negatively to a greater degree in France than in Japan.  The EU 
implemented the E-Money Directive to promote the growth of electronic 
money, but monetary concerns influenced the Directive’s creation.  
Compared to the Japanese Prepaid Card Law, the E-Money Directive 
presents a complex regulatory scheme with rigid capital requirements.  
France’s application of the Directive reflects this complex scheme and adds 
further constraints.  The EU’s recent proposal for a new Directive strongly 
suggests that the EU currently over-regulates stored-value cards. 
A. Number of Non-Legal Factors Account for the Low Usage of Stored-
Value Cards in France 
Many of the same non-legal factors at play in Japan explain the low 
take-up levels of stored-value cards in France.  France’s payment culture 
relies more on debit cards and less on cash.  Technological delay and 
different business strategies also explain Moneo’s low usage rates.  
The structure of the French payments market may account for the low 
demand for stored-value cards.  Compared to Japan, France relies more on 
debit cards and checks as payment methods.100  If debit cards, which are 
widespread in France,101 function as a substitute for cash,102 then France 
does not have a void that stored-value cards would fill.  In addition, France 
has one of the lowest currency to GDP ratios in the developed world,103 so 
stored-value cards may not seem as intuitive to French consumers as to 
Japanese consumers.   
                                           
100
  BANK OF INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, COMM. ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYS., BANK FOR 
INT'L SETTLEMENTS, RETAIL PAYMENTS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 25-26 (1999), 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss33.htm [hereinafter BIS RETAIL PAYMENTS STUDY]. 
101
  Id. at 25. 
102
  See Mann, supra note 12, at 1102.  
103
  Currency to GDP ratios are one way to measure the use of cash in a given country.  BIS RETAIL 
PAYMENTS STUDY, supra note 100, at 9.  Japan has one of the highest currency to GDP ratios in the world.  
Id.   
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Unlike its Japanese counterparts, Moneo did not begin using 
contactless technology until 2006.104  Moneo may be a victim of technology 
delay, which may have put it at a temporary disadvantage compared to other 
forms of payment.  Japan’s Felica105 contactless technology, used by most 
issuers in Japan, does not meet European payment security standards, and 
could not have been used there.106  Today, only 300,000 contactless Moneo 
cards circulate in France.107  Without the added convenience of contactless 
payment, French consumers may be unwilling to switch over to Moneo.  
Finally, Moneo competes directly with other payment methods, 
especially debit cards and credit cards.  Indeed, Moneo’s main purpose is to 
provide a payment service,108 unlike Japan’s Suica and Pasmo, the main 
purpose of which is to provide a transportation card.  Worse, many French 
debit cards include the Moneo function, thereby further blurring stored-value 
cards’ distinctive features. 109   Without additional benefits for either 
merchants or consumers compared to other payment systems, the high costs 
of installing terminals, and transaction fees paid by both merchants and 
customers impair Moneo’s spread. 110   Moneo’s planned launch of a 
transportation card in 2009, and its decision to partner with corporations and 
universities to offer cards that can be bundled with other functions, 111 
suggests that its original business strategy may not have taken into account 
all the possibilities that stored-value cards offer.   
B. The E-Money Directive’s Financial Characterization of Stored-Value 
Cards Results in a Complex Regulatory System with Strict Prudential 
Requirements 
The EU’s characterization of stored-value cards differs substantially 
from the Japanese stance.  Monetary concerns colored the formation of the 
E-Money Directive, resulting in a relatively complex regulatory system with 
rigid capital requirements.  France’s implementation of the Directive reflects 
this complex structure but further rigidifies its requirements. 
                                           
104
  See Moneo, Dossier de Presse [Moneo Press Kit], at 8 (Feb. 2009), http://www.moneo.net/ 
fileadmin/user_upload/PDF/plaquette_institutionnelle_2008-p15.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2009). 
105
  Felica is a contactless smart card produced by the Sony Corporation (which was originally 
designed as a transportation card).  The name originates from a contraction of “Felicity” and “Card.”  See 
IWATA, supra note 1, at 228.  
106
  See id. at 228-29.   
107
  See Moneo, Dossier de Presse, supra note 104, at 8.  
108
  Moneo Website, A propos de Moneo [About Moneo], http://www.moneo.net/a-propos-de-
moneo.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).  
109
  OBSERVATOIRE DE LA SECURITE DES CARTES DE PAIEMENT, supra note 37, at 14.  
110
  EVALUATION OF THE E-MONEY DIRECTIVE, supra note 17, at 26.  
111
  See Moneo, Dossier de Presse, supra note 104, at 8. 
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1. The E-Money Directive Is Rooted in Monetary Regulation 
The emergence of the first electronic money products in the early 
1990s prompted European central banks and ministries to begin regulating 
electronic money.112  As an initial step, the European Monetary Institute113 
published a report where it characterized issuers of multi-purpose stored-
value cards as institutions taking deposits from the public and demanded 
their regulation under existing banking laws.114   
The European Central Bank (“ECB”) identified monetary policy and 
consumer protection as its main concerns, and produced a report in 1998 
arguing for a strong regulatory framework.115  The first concern was that 
private issuers could over-issue electronic money and thus impact price 
stability by flooding the market with electronic money disconnected from 
central bank currency.116   Meanwhile, from the perspective of consumer 
protection, the ECB was concerned that electronic money issuers would face 
liquidity risks similar to those experienced by credit institutions because the 
business of stored-value cards amounts to deposit taking.117  Prepayments 
made to an issuer are generally not left idle, but invested for a return, and 
unsound investment policy could potentially jeopardize the consumer’s 
prepaid funds. 118   Finally, if electronic money were to become a valid 
substitute for cash transactions, the failure of an issuer could affect the 
stability of payments markets.119  With respect to such concerns, the ECB 
believed that electronic money issuers should be subject to prudential 
provisions similar to those governing credit institutions.120   
Many countries, including France, heeded the ECB’s warnings and 
adopted laws that limited the issuance of electronic money to credit 
institutions and subjected prepaid funds to deposit insurance.121  SFPMEI, 
Moneo’s issuer created in 1999, emerged when the French government 
intended to limit electronic money to credit institutions.122   
                                           
112
  EVALUATION OF THE E-MONEY DIRECTIVE, supra note 17, at 18.   
113
  The European Monetary Institute is the predecessor to the European Central Bank (ECB).   
114
  Ramasastry, supra note 8, at 681.   
115  EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, REPORT ON ELECTRONIC MONEY, at 13-20 (Aug. 1998), 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/emoneyen.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009).  
116
  See id. at 13.  
117
  Id.  
118
  Id. at 15.  
119
  See id. at 15-16.   
120
  Id. at 14-15.  
121
  See Dévelopments Récents en Matière de Monnaie Electronique, supra note 18, at 91. 
122
  Id.; Moneo, Le Porte Monnaie Electronique Français, supra note 16, at 13. 
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Fearing that a proliferation of ad-hoc national rules would stifle 
competition, innovation, and a common European market in the payment 
sector, the European Commission123 proposed a directive that reflected the 
Commission’s desire to provide a legal framework that would encourage 
innovation.124  The ECB, on the other hand, concluded that the simplest way 
to regulate electronic money would be to limit the issuance of electronic 
money to credit institutions.125  The final version of the Directive, commonly 
referred to as the E-Money Directive, reflects the divergent positions of the 
European Commission and the ECB.126 
2. The E-Money Directive Creates a Complex Three-Tiered Regulatory 
System with Rigid Prudential Requirements 
The conflicting interests of the ECB and European Commission 
produced a complex three-tiered system that imposes rigid prudential 
requirements.  The E-Money Directive requires member states to prohibit 
“persons or undertakings that are not credit institutions” from carrying on 
the business of issuing electronic money.127   Banks that issue electronic 
money are covered under the prudential regime of the Directive Relating to 
the Taking Up and Pursuit of Credit Institutions,128 which requires them to 
adhere to strict prudential requirements. 
However, the E-Money Directive creates a new category of 
institution, the Electronic Money Institution (“ELMI”), which can also issue 
electronic money.129  Some of the more relevant prudential requirements 
imposed on ELMIs include sound and prudent operations,130 investments of 
an amount no less than the institutions’ financial liabilities related 
outstanding electronic money,131 redeemability at “par value,”132 restriction 
                                           
123
  The European Commission is the executive arm of the European Union and is responsible for 
proposing legislation, implementing decisions, and upholding the Union's treaties.   
124
  EVALUATION OF THE E-MONEY DIRECTIVE, supra note 38, at 19.   
125
  See European Central Bank, supra note 115, at 13-20.   
126
  EVALUATION OF THE E-MONEY DIRECTIVE, supra note 17, at 20.  The Directive also reflects the 
European Commission’s desire to create “a level playing field between electronic money institutions and 
other credit institutions issuing electronic money” by balancing the “less cumbersome features of the 
prudential supervisory regime applying to electronic money institutions” with “provisions that are more 
stringent than those applying to credit institutions, notably as regards restrictions on the business activities 
which electronic money institutions may carry on . . . .”  Council Directive 2000/46/EC, rec. 1, 12, 2000 
O.J. (L 275). 
127
  Council Directive 2000/46/EC, art. 1 (4), 2000 O.J. (L 275).   
128
  Council Directive 2000/12/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 126). 
129
  See Ramasastry, supra note 8, at 683. 
130
  Council Directive 2000/46/EC, art. 7, 2000 O.J. (L 275).   
131
  Id. art. 5. 
132
  Id. art. 3. 
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of activities to those that are closely related to issuing e-money,133 and a 
capital base of at least one million euro.134  This last requirement, unlike the 
Japanese Prepaid Card Law, provides a rigid capital requirement that is 
independent of the size of the issuer. 
The E-Money Directive waives some of these requirements for a third 
category of institution.  The waiver scheme covers institutions that issue 
electronic money on a limited scale, and limit the storage amount of stored-
value cards (and other electronic devices) to 150 euro.135   Furthermore, 
issuers must satisfy one of several criteria:  1) financial liabilities must not 
normally exceed five million euro and never exceed 6 million euro; 2) the 
electronic money issued may only be accepted by subsidiaries of the issuer, 
any parent undertaking of the institution, or any other subsidiary of that 
parent undertaking; or 3) the electronic money shall only be accepted by a 
limited number of undertakings defined by close geographic area or a 
common distribution scheme.136  Although the waiver broadens the range of 
institutions authorized to issue electronic money and eliminates capital 
requirements, it also severely restricts the activities in which these 
institutions can engage.   
3. French Regulation Replicates the E-Money Directive with Added 
Constraints and Complicates Matters for Issuers 
France transposed the E-Money Directive into a domestic regulation 
in 2003.137  Although the regulation generally adopts the same definition of 
electronic money as the E-Money Directive, it construes ELMIs as a sub-
category of credit institutions.138  Issuers that limit their activities to issuing, 
offering and managing electronic money follow prudential requirements that 
do not apply to regular credit institutions. 139   French regulation departs 
somewhat from the E-Money Directive by preventing issuers from owning 
stock in companies that do not have an “accessory function” to the business 
of electronic money.140  Like the E-Money Directive, French regulation also 
                                           
133
  Id. art. 5(a)-(b). 
134
  Id. art. 4(1). 
135
  Id.  
136
  Id. art. 8(1); see also Ramasastry, supra note 8, at 683. 
137
  Arrêté du 10 janvier 2003 portant homologation du règlement n° 2002-13 du Comité de la 
réglementation bancaire et financière, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette 
of France], Feb. 1, 2003, at 2003 (Annexed Document), available at http://www.banque-france.fr/fr/supervi 
/telechar/regle_bafi/crbf02-13.pdf [hereinafter Regulation no. 2002-13].   
138
  See id. art. 2. 
139
  Id. art. 12.  
140
  Id. 
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waives some of the requirements for institutions whose financial 
engagements relative to electronic money do not normally exceed five 
million euro and never exceed 6 million euro.141  Nevertheless, under the 
waiver, institutions must still meet a minimum capital requirement of one 
million euro and limit their business to issuing electronic money.142   
Compared to Japan’s Prepaid Card Law, France’s three-tiered 
regulation complicates matters for issuers.  In France, non-bank institutions 
seeking to issue stored-value cards must either register as an ELMI or apply 
for a waiver.  Limitations on the activities of ELMIs also require institutions 
to set up a separate entity if their main business is not to issue stored-value 
cards.143  This requirement is particularly problematic in Europe because 
some of the most compelling business models for electronic stored-value 
systems have arguably emerged from non-banks, such as cell phone 
providers. 144   France’s implementation of the E-Money Directive thus 
provides additional headaches for potential non-bank issuers.   
Nor does the waiver regime provide an adequate alternative for non-
bank issuers because the lower capital requirement exemptions only apply to 
small-scale issuers.  More importantly, the activity limitations on ELMIs still 
apply to issuers operating under the waiver, which means that the waiver 
regime presents few advantages besides lower capital requirements.  Activity 
limitations on institutions operating under the waiver also represent a 
significant departure from the E-Money Directive, which does not require 
such limitations.145   
France’s regulation also imposes rigid capital requirements that are 
not necessarily proportional to the risks taken by issuers.  While the 
Japanese Prepaid Card law requires the maintenance of a capital base that is 
proportionate to the amount received by the issuer, the French regulation 
requires a minimum threshold capital requirement of 2.2 million euro to 
establish an ELMI (higher than the E-Money Directive), or one million euro 
to operate under the waiver.146  These rigid capital requirements have the 
potential for discouraging new market entrants.   
                                           
141
  Id. art. 19.  
142
  Id. 
143
  See IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 29, at 14 (in the broader context of the European Union). 
144
  See Hugo Godschalk & Malte Krueger, Why E-Money Still Fails, Paper Prepared for the Third 
Berlin Internet Economics Workshop 8 (May 26-27 2000), available at http://www.paysys.de/download/ 
Berlin5.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009). 
145
  See supra Part IV.B.2. 
146
  Arrêté du 31 décembre 1992 portant homologation des règlements du Comité de la règlementation 
bancaire et financière, Règlement No. 92-13, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official 
Gazette of France], Jan. 9, 1993, at 513 (as amended), art. 1, available at http://www.banque-
france.fr/fr/supervi/telechar/regle_bafi/textes/CRBF92_14.pdf.  Since the waiver for electronic money 
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In summary, France’s regulation seems more cumbersome than 
Japan’s for two reasons.  First, it creates a complicated regulatory framework 
that forces issuers to limit their business activities or set up a separate entity.  
Second, it imposes high, rigid capital requirements.   
C. The EU Acknowledges That the E-Money Directive Has Not Fulfilled 
Its Objectives and Is Considering a New Directive 
The European Commission published the final report of the 
Evaluation of the E-Money Directive in 2006, 147  which prompted the 
proposal of a new Directive to replace the 2000 E-Money Directive in 
2008.148  The Evaluation assessed the use of stored-value cards, reporting 
that their use remained stagnant after the implementation of the Directive, 
and even experienced a downward trend in some countries.149  It also noted 
that, by the end of 2005, few ELMIs had emerged in Europe.  Most countries, 
except for the United Kingdom, had minimal or no electronic money activity 
at all, with credit institutions still accounting for the majority of electronic 
money circulating in Europe.150  The number of entities registered under the 
Directive’s waiver provision grew more rapidly, but an overwhelming 
majority of these were operating in the United Kingdom and the Czech 
Republic, many of them without actually issuing electronic money.151  As of 
2006, no ELMIs or institutions operating under the waiver existed in 
France. 152   Generally, the Evaluation concluded that the number of 
newcomers to the European electronic money industry remained 
unsatisfactorily low.153 
Although delayed implementation of the Directive by member states 
and other market factors partially explains the low level of new market 
participants in electronic money,154 the European Commission acknowledges 
that ELMIs face an overly restrictive prudential regime that discourages new 
market entrants.155  For example, the European Commission recognizes that 
limitations on the activities of ELMIs hinder the development of hybrid 
                                                                                                                              
institutions in art. 1(d) only applies to institutions whose financial engagements never exceed 6 million 
euro, art. 1(c) applies.  Art. 1(c) imposes a 2.2 million euro capital requirement for non-bank “financial 
companies.”  Id. 
147
  EVALUATION OF THE E-MONEY DIRECTIVE, supra note 17, at 20. 
148
  See 2008 Council Proposal, supra note 13. 
149
  EVALUATION OF THE E-MONEY DIRECTIVE, supra note 17, at 28-29. 
150
  Id. at 38-40. 
151
  Id. at 39. 
152
  Id. app. at 22.  
153
  Id. expl. memo. at 2-3. 
154
  Id. at 45. 
155
  See IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 29, at 12.  
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institutions because these limitations require hybrid entities to set up 
separate businesses at significant cost.156  Redeemability of prepaid funds 
creates problems with issuers of electronic vouchers, which have trouble 
separating the issued electronic value from their bundled products.157  High 
capital requirements discourage smaller market entrants.158  Thus, the overall 
prudential requirements of the E-Money Directive appear disproportionate to 
the risks presented by stored-value cards.159   
Many potential non-bank issuers have expressed dissatisfaction with 
the E-Money Directive, especially its muddled structure.  European cellular 
phone operators, including France’s Orange, have criticized the E-Money 
Directive because it fails to grasp the hybrid nature of institutions whose 
core business is not supplying payment services, but that nonetheless stand 
to benefit from issuing electronic money.160  Many agree that the European 
Directive discourages the development of prepaid services in the cellular 
industry because of regulatory uncertainty as to whether the Directive 
applies to them.161  Accor, a French hotel chain that has long been issuing 
paper vouchers, has argued that the Directive has prevented it from making 
the switch to electronic vouchers.162  Many potential issuers advocate either 
repealing or amending the Directive to exclude vouchers and cellular phone 
providers’ prepaid services from the definition of electronic money.163   
The proposed Directive responds to these concerns by lowering the 
capital requirements to 125,000 euro and expanding the scope of acceptable 
ELMI activities, notably by allowing ELMIs to “engage in business 
activities other than the issuance of electronic money, having regard to 
applicable Community and National Law.” 164   Although this proposed 
Directive basically lowers the burden for market entrants and allows the 
bundling of electronic money with other services, it does not change the 
complex three-tiered system.165 
                                           
156
  Id. at 14. 
157
  Id.  
158
  Id. at 14-15. 
159
 2008 Council Proposal, supra note 13, expl. memo. at 2-3.   
160
  ORANGE GROUP, REVIEW OF THE E-MONEY DIRECTIVE, ORANGE GROUP POSITION 1 (2006), 
available at http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/markt/markt_consultations/library?l=/financial_services/e-
money_directive [hereinafter ORANGE REPORT].   
161
  Id. at 2; see also GSM EUROPE RESPONSE, CONSULTATION ON THE REVIEW OF THE E-MONEY 
DIRECTIVE 1-2 (Oct. 2005), available at http://www.gsmeurope.org/documents/positions/2005/gsme_ob 
servations_on_ec_consultation.pdflibrary?l=/financial_services/e-money_directive&vm=detailed&sb=Title 
(last visited May 6, 2009) [hereinafter GSM RESPONSE]. 
162
  EVALUATION OF THE E-MONEY DIRECTIVE, supra note 17, at 33.  
163
  ORANGE REPORT, supra note 160, at 3-4; GSM RESPONSE, supra note 161, at 12-14.   
164
  See 2008 Council Proposal, supra note 13, art. 8． 
165
  Id. art. 4 (prohibition on issuing e-money).  
AUGUST 2009 REGULATING STORED-VALUE CARDS 545 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The regulation of stored-value cards in Japan and the EU reflects 
drastically different characterizations of these payment systems.  Japanese 
stored-value cards generally fall outside the reach of most banking laws.  
Under the Prepaid Card Law, stored-value cards are vouchers, which can be 
issued by any person or institution, provided that they provide guarantees to 
the voucher holder.  In contrast, the EU adopted the view that stored-value 
cards should be subject to bank-like regulation because of their potential 
impact on monetary policy.  The E-Money Directive’s three-tiered structure 
reflects this initial characterization of electronic money as a financial activity.  
Only credit institutions may issue electronic money, with limited allowances 
for ELMIs and institutions operating under the waiver regime.  In contrast, 
Japan avoids sweeping stored-value cards under a bank-like prudential 
system by characterizing stored-value cards as vouchers.   
Regulation by itself cannot explain the lack of demand for stored-
value cards in Europe and growing demand in Japan.  Japanese issuers have 
emerged in a unique environment with a payment culture and payment 
institutions not replicated in Europe.  Japanese issuers have also ingenuously 
exploited these unique characteristics in developing their business models.   
Nevertheless, the E-Money Directive saddles stored-value cards with 
a complicated regulatory structure and high capital requirements, something 
that the Japanese Prepaid Card Law manages to avoid.  While determining 
the degree to which the E-Money Directive has hindered the development of 
stored-value cards is difficult, its confusing three-tiered prudential system 
certainly has not made it easy for non-bank and hybrid issuers to develop 
stored-value cards.  Non-bank issuers have expressed dissatisfaction with the 
confusing three-tiered structure, limitation on business activities for ELMIs, 
and prudential requirements that are not proportional to the risks undertaken 
by the issuers.  The absence of major issuers besides Moneo in France is also 
revealing.  In this light, the proposed revision to the E-Money Directive 
appears to be an admission that the current regulation is excessive.  Seen 
from the perspective of the EU, the Prepaid Card Law’s overarching 
qualities seem to be its comparatively simple framework and flexible capital 
requirements.   
Yet, as technological developments transform the nature of stored-
value cards, the Prepaid Card Law characterization of stored value-cards as 
simple vouchers appears increasingly outdated.  Japan is now set to revisit 
its regulation of stored-value cards with a Payment Services Bill that 
broadens the concept of “voucher” to “prepaid payment instrument.”  As 
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Japan steams ahead with its stored-value cards, students of electronic money 
worldwide may be pressed to see how Japanese regulators address future 
legal challenges. 
